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Among its many costs, September 11, 2001, stunted the
development of federal government policy in ways that,
hard as it is to believe, are still underappreciated. Consider the United States Department of Justice, specifically
its criminal enforcement mission. We have been distracted from—or perhaps inexcusably have lacked
interest in having—a critically important conversation
about the future of this mission.
Having quite deliberately, and in many cases for good
reason, created in the criminal jurisdiction of our federal
courts the most powerful tools available to any domestic
actor, we have failed to discuss explicitly how these tools
ought to be used. And, most urgently, we have not thought
carefully about how to design executive branch institutions to give law enforcement officials the proper
incentives to use those tools for good rather than ill.
Many of the innovative devices of modern federal law
enforcement—things like the Title III scheme for electronic surveillance, the RICO statutes, flexible procedural
and evidentiary rules surrounding conspiracy liability,
enhanced penalties for weapons offenses connected to
narcotics and violent crimes, money laundering crimes,
and so on—have been success stories to the extent they
have assisted society in keeping pace with the most threatening and dangerous actors bent on imposing harm on
others.
The problems these laws present are ones of overbreadth: how to manage legal space within which
enforcers may use these laws to sanction individuals who
do not deserve serious sanction or persons whose behaviors are not sufficiently harmful to justify costly deterrence
efforts. The conversation we need to have about these
laws, and about the institutions through which they are
enforced, is not a conversation about repealing or expanding them so much as a conversation about how to use
them. However good the policy justifications for creating
these laws, we have made the contemporary federal prosecutor a kid in a candy store. Most do not act like children,
of course. But we have not even tried to create incentives
that would steer enforcement actors toward relatively
fewer and more labor-intensive cases involving sophisticated and threatening criminal actors and away from
high-volume cases involving low-level criminal actors for

whom the powerful tools of federal law enforcement are
unnecessary and often terribly costly overkill.
Between roughly 1970 and 2000, the institution of federal criminal justice passed through a sea change. Prior to
1970 (and perhaps leaving aside Prohibition’s early-twentieth-century detour), the federal prosecutor’s office was a
small social institution that mostly affected specialized
areas of government concern like the post office and occasionally, though with limited effects, a handful of
high-profile problems like the Mafia. By 2000, it was a
major regulatory bureaucracy that had produced the
largest prison population in the United States and reached
into nearly every area of pressing social concern, ranging
from regulation of corporate managers in vast financial
markets to the control of people and contraband, and associated harmful activities, flowing into the United States
from abroad.
This transformation was no accident. Congress, the
executive branch, and the courts all deliberately facilitated
the change, primarily in four ways: rapid expansion, in
both quantity and breadth, of substantive federal crimes; a
massive, innovative project to impose determinate and
equality-based sentencing, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines; dramatic growth in the size and resources of
the federal criminal bureaucracy, especially the numbers
of federal agents, prosecutors, judges, courthouses, and
prisons; and, with somewhat less impact, rejection in the
period after the Warren Court of opportunities to limit
police and prosecutorial powers through rules of criminal
procedure, constitutional and otherwise. The political
economy of crime in the United States generated demand
for legal and institutional change in the federal government and this demand was answered, if not sated.
By the end of the 1990s, consumer’s remorse began to
creep into the system, at least among academics and some
judges. Regret manifested itself in sharp criticism, and a
slight retrenching move or two in the judiciary, in the
areas of determinate sentencing and expanded liability
rules. A growing chorus of critics blamed synergies
between broad and redundant liability rules and ever more
severe and less flexible sentencing guidelines for producing a regime that made it far too easy for prosecutors to
use charging and plea bargaining practices to obtain guilty
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pleas in too high a proportion of cases to, on average, too
high terms of imprisonment. Serious questions were arising about the overall size of the federal prison population
and the relative dangerousness and culpability of many
members of that population. Then came September 11.
The beginning of the George W. Bush administration
would have been an opportune time for an assessment of
the costs and benefits of the great explosion in federal
criminal law of the end of the last century and for a discussion about the role of federal criminal justice in the new
century. That discussion, although it had been gaining
momentum in the academy and the courts, never reached
the legislature or executive. Perhaps it never would have,
from lack of political will. But September 11 ensured that it
did not, by placing nearly the entire federal government in
reactive and defensive modes of thinking from which it
has not been dislodged. Not only did global affairs push
domestic crime control, among many other matters, off
the national policy agenda but much of the law enforcement bureaucracy was diverted to an ill-defined mission of
preventing terrorist attacks for which it was poorly
equipped and to which it struggled to adapt. Ironically, the
consensus on September 12 that “everything is forever different” has been a major impediment to reformative
thinking about crime control.
Should a new administration wish to cast fresh eyes on
the role of federal criminal justice in twenty-first-century
America, here are three questions it should ask itself.
First, what if anything happened during those transformative three decades at the end of the last century that was an
innovation of genuine social value? Though critics do not
often acknowledge the gains, there was much to like in the
performance of federal criminal justice in the period from
1970 to 2000. Coupling of enforcement resources with
innovative legal tools like the RICO statutes produced historic gains that have crippled if not destroyed core
organized crime as we knew it. Although international
alien smuggling and drug trafficking networks are seemingly ineradicable, money laundering enforcement and
conspiracy prosecutions, and extraterritorial reach of federal criminal law and its enforcement, have hampered
their ability to operate with impunity across the globe. The
law’s deterrent arsenal against sophisticated, large-scale
corporate fraud is now bolstered by a highly credible threat
of effective prosecution and serious punishment that used
to be practically nonexistent. Some of the reduction in
homicide rates in major urban areas of the past fifteen
years is undoubtedly attributable to the innovation of prosecuting the most violent gang leaders in federal court,
using tools previously reserved for traditional organized
crime.
These are a few among what can legitimately be
claimed as victories. Crime conducted for profit, like any
industry, evolves and grows more sophisticated. This is
true whether such pursuits involve fraud, narcotics trafficking, robbery, gambling rackets, corruption in government,
laundering of the criminal profits of others, or any number

of other pursuits of the criminal entrepreneur. Federal
court has been the primary venue in which the law—
created, adapted, and given enforcement resources by
members of Congress, federal prosecutors, and federal
judges—has kept pace with these developments.
Second, what unwanted social costs did these innovations produce? The principal problem with the federal
criminal justice system is that it has grown vastly overbroad. In an effort to maintain legal tools that are
state-of-the-art, legislators, prosecutors, and judges have
created a regime that has the capacity to massively oversanction. Steep sentencing multipliers for crack cocaine
and certain kinds of gun cases might be useful in leveraging testimony that brings down leaders of violent street
gangs, but they permit draconian sentences to be imposed
on the low-level cocaine possessor or the petty criminal
with a record who happens to possess a handgun, often
with racially discriminatory impacts.
A broad money laundering statute can help the law
reach the financier whose knowledge about the specifics
of underlying criminal activity might be tough to prove,
but it also risks allowing prosecution of relatively unwitting people who engage in downstream commercial
transactions that happen to involve criminal proceeds.
RICO’s conspiracy provision might make it easier to reach
mob bosses who keep themselves distant from criminal
acts by delegating tasks to underlings, but it can also lead
to serious federal prosecution of a government executive
who did not do enough to prevent some graft in her
administration. Overbreadth problems like this arise in
virtually every area of substantive and procedural federal
criminal law that is implicated in the pursuit of sophisticated and difficult-to-prosecute criminal activity.
Third, what could be done to salvage the benefits of a
transformed federal law enforcement bureaucracy while
working to eliminate its costly by-products? One approach
would be to continue to rely on the informal compromises
that have guided the system to this point. On the whole,
federal prosecutors have exercised restraint in reserving
the potent legal tools they possess for the kinds of serious
cases for which such tools are genuinely necessary. On the
whole, Congress has been willing to grant broad tools to
the executive branch on the understanding that such powers will not be abused. On the whole, the federal judiciary
has refrained from sharply curtailing executive branch
powers in the belief that the Justice Department sees itself
as a responsible public institution and not simply a litigant
that should push every advantage to its logical limit.
But these compromises seem more unsteady as the
federal criminal justice bureaucracy, especially its prison
population, continues to mushroom and as the executive
branch, in recent years, pursues legal positions that depart
from preexisting norms. It is high time that federal policy
makers asked themselves much more self-consciously
what should be done to ensure that federal enforcement is
channeled toward the acute problems for which its awesome powers are uniquely suited and away from wasteful
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oversanctioning of relatively unthreatening actors and
behaviors.
Bureaucracies, after all, can be expected to behave like
bureaucracies the larger and more entrenched they grow.
Lack of enforceable legal controls and the iron tendency of
bureaucrats to stray from their public missions and
behave in a lazy or self-interested manner are certain to
produce greater problems in the future. It is deeply concerning that in the short span from 1989 to 2003 the
number of assistant United States attorneys more than
doubled and the number of federal prisoners more than
tripled.1 If the purpose of federal court, at least where its
jurisdiction largely duplicates state criminal jurisdiction,
is to deal with the toughest of problems, do we really need
such a big institution? The Justice Department ought to
look seriously at shrinking the size of the federal criminal
justice bureaucracy, while evaluating its performance with
qualitative measures that deny significance to the numbers of prosecutors, prosecutions, prisoners, or prisoner
years that the system produces. Powerful legal tools need
not be dismantled in order to ensure that they are not used
in the wrong kinds of cases.
The United States Department of Justice is a uniquely
valuable domestic institution. After a period of stunning
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ascendancy at the end of the last century, the institution
has faltered—perhaps as much from strategic neglect as
from deliberate diversion of its mission in service of political and foreign policy objectives that most Americans have
concluded were misguided. A twenty-first-century executive branch should set as a priority thoughtful
consideration of how to confine the powerful tools of federal criminal enforcement to the pressing social harms
that justify their existence.
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